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I. Changing Financial Climate for Climate Change Finance
How can the global environmental order, especially for climate change, 
be streamlined and sustained? Cooperative actions for global environmental 
taxes can serve as an effective policy tool for this purpose. Proposals 
for new and increased taxes are never popular, even politically taboo, 
especially in the midst of the current fi nancial crisis, and environmental 
taxes are often perceived parochially and shortsightedly. It is erroneous to 
consider the present crisis simply as a fi nancial crisis. Rather, it is a crisis 
of global governance in the regime complex of fi nancial, environmental, 
and social issues. The existing literature tends to regard the regime complex 
as a constraint, but it can also provide us with a chance to improve global 
governance by linking overarching and crosscutting norms and rules. The 
regime complex should also be understood as a dynamic open system, rather 
than as static closed structures. Thus, the current regime complex crisis 
opens a window of opportunity for dynamically transforming anarchical 
international society into a low-carbon global community with invention and 
innovation in climate fi nance.
The scenarios for determining “dangerous anthropocentric interference 
with the climate system” made by the Fourth Assessment Report of the 
Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) stimulated negotiations 
at the 2007 United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change 
(UNFCCC) conference in Bali, where a road map to Copenhagen was agreed 
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6on.(1) The Kyoto Protocol has not been working effectively, especially for the 
two largest emitters, the United States and China, which accounted for about 
20% of global emissions respectively in 2006, and other Annex I countries, 
which accounted for 30% of emissions as a whole. The IPCC scenario for CO2
stabilization at 450 ppm requires all Annex I countries to reduce emissions 
by between 25% and 40% by 2020 and by between 80% and 95% by 2050, 
compared with the base year of 1990. Some negotiation proposals in the 
negotiation text (UNFCCC, 2009, p. 43) estimated that fi nancial resources 
should amount to about US$200 billion for mitigation actions and at least 
US$67 billion for adaptation actions per year by 2020. For the main emitters 
to meaningfully join a post-2012 regime, the negotiation puzzles of mitigation, 
adaptation, and fi nancing must be solved effi ciently and effectively.
It should be noted that the political and social responses to the current 
fi nancial crisis since the G8 Hokkaido Toyako Summit have led to the emerging 
idea of “a green new deal,” (Andrew Simms, et al., 2008) both nationally 
and globally, under which economic recovery and sustainable development 
should be facilitated by reregulation of greenhouse gas emissions and capital 
movement. With the International Labour Organization’s Green Job Initiative 
and the United Nations Environment Programme’s Green Economy Initiative, 
UN Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon called for a global Green New Deal at 
the World Economic Forum in Davos. US President Barack Obama and other 
G20 leaders pledged to “build an inclusive, green, and sustainable recovery,” 
and agreed to “take action against noncooperative jurisdictions, including 
tax havens” (Communiqué from the G20 London Summit 2009). The G8 
Environmental Ministers (Siracusa Environment Ministerial Meeting, 2009) 
showed a strong willingness to reach “an ambitious agreement” in Copenhagen, 
by acknowledging that “private sector representatives recalled the importance 
of having a clear long-term regulatory framework to create an enabling 
According to the IPCC, the danger threshold could be a rise in the average surface temperature 
of two degrees Celsius by 2100.
(1)
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environment for high capital investment.” The G8 Energy Ministers stressed 
the role of public–private partnership in a new energy order, which supports 
energy investment, eradicates energy poverty, and combats climate change (Joint 
Statement, 2009). The G8 L’Aquila Summit (Chair’s summary, 2009) agreed on 
“a global long-term goal of reducing global emissions by at least 50% by 2050 
and, as part of this, on an 80% or more reduction goal for developed countries 
by 2050” and “a need to scale-up climate fi nancing” with particular attention 
to Mexico’s proposal for Green Fund. The Major Economies Forum (MEF) on 
Energy and Climate shared the view that fi nancing should derive from multiple 
sources, public and private, national and international. As such, in the changing 
fi nancial climate for climate change fi nance, carbon taxes or levies can be an 
effective game-changer for national and international actions.
The purpose of this paper is not to repeat the old debate on which policy 
instrument is economically best, but to argue that the advantages of global 
environmental taxes are greater than their disadvantages under the foreseeable 
conditions in the context of transforming the regime complex. By global 
environmental taxes, I mean environmentally related taxes defi ned as “any 
compulsory, unrequited payment to general government levied on tax bases 
deemed to be of particular environmental relevance” (OECD, 2006) in the 
global context. Following Raustiala and Victor (2004), the regime complex is 
defi ned as “an array of partially overlapping and nonhierarchical institutions 
governing a particular issue area.” Regime dynamics or transformation refers to 
“signifi cant alterations in a regime’s structures of rights and rules, the character 
of its social choice mechanisms, and the nature of its compliance mechanisms” 
(Young, 1982).
In the following sections, fi rst, theoretical issues of global environmental 
taxes in the regime complex will be briefl y discussed with reference to a series 
of proposals submitted to the negotiation table for Copenhagen. Then, the issue 
of how carbon taxes can benefi t global governance of the regime complex and 
regime transformation will be presented.
8II. Taxis in Cosmos: Taxonomy of Carbon Taxes in the Regime 
Complex
1. Climate Finance
In the domestic context, environmental taxes, subsidies, and emissions 
trading are regarded as mixed measures somewhere between a command-and-
control type of direct regulation by the public sector and nonbinding voluntary 
efforts by the private sector. In the international context, these measures can be 
implemented unilaterally, jointly, collectively, or cooperatively, although there 
are few precedents for environmental taxes in an internationally coordinated 
way. In accounting for regime dynamics, Young (1982) conceptualized three 
types of orders: imposed, negotiated, and spontaneous. If global environmental 
taxes are imposed unilaterally or jointly by one or more dominant powers, they 
could be a refl ection of hegemonic power. If each state adopts environmental 
taxes voluntarily even without any international agreements, or if businesses 
and individuals restrain themselves and act to reduce emissions of greenhouse 
gases (GHGs), then there could be a spontaneous order at the global level. 
A number of proposals submitted to the climate fi nance negotiation table 
are regarded as negotiated orders, somewhere between what Hayek (1973) 
called taxis, conscious orders, and cosmos, unconscious orders, although a 
negotiated outcome may become an unintended resultant with or without global 
environmental taxes.
The draft negotiation text (UNFCCC, 2009, pp. 15, 23, 42–43) for 
Copenhagen enumerated several proposals for new and additional fi nancial 
resources: (1) assessed contributions; (2) auctioning of assigned amounts and/or 
emission allowances; (3) levies on CO2 emissions; (4) levies on emissions from 
international aviation and maritime transport; (5) an international air passenger 
adaptation levy on airfares; (6) shares of proceeds on the clean development 
mechanism (CDM), joint implementation, and emissions trading; (7) levies on 
international monetary transactions; (8) fi nes on noncompliance of developed 
countries with their emissions reduction and fi nancial resources commitments; 
and (9) additional offi cial development assistance (ODA) and bilateral, regional, 
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and other multilateral channels. Broadly defi ned, all of these options may be 
called global environmental taxes or their equivalents. Assessed contributions 
for all or some member countries may be designed based on internationally 
agreed or to-be-agreed principles, such as equity, common but differentiated 
responsibility, ability to pay, the polluter pays, and historical responsibility. 
Emissions trading and carbon taxes have theoretically the same environmental 
effectiveness, but the former cannot generate public revenues unless emission 
allowances are auctioned (Norway’s submission, 2008).
In a narrow sense, global carbon taxes refer to global levies on CO2
emissions. There can be diverse variations of global carbon taxes in terms of 
substance, such as CO2 emissions or carbon-intensive products and services, and 
in terms of process, such as being implemented collectively or cooperatively. 
The Swiss proposal (2008) constitutes a uniform global carbon levy on all 
fossil fuel emissions, and revenues are used partially for national measures and 
partially transferred to severely affected countries, through a multilateral regime, 
especially to fi nance adaptation activities.
The issue of equity between industrial sectors entails the proposals 
for taxes on some specifi c sectors. Emissions from international air and sea 
transport, which were not covered by the Kyoto Protocol, are growing at a 
high ratio. The European Community called for action within the frameworks 
of the International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO) and the International 
Maritime Organization (IMO), and proposed that international aviation and 
maritime transport be included in an emissions trading scheme in a post-2012 
agreement (Submission by Slovenia, 2008, pp.61-63). Denmark (2007) 
submitted a proposal to the IMO on a global levy on marine bunkers. Following 
the experience of the French-led solidarity levy to combat HIV/AIDS, the Least 
Developed Countries (LDC) group proposed a solidarity levy on international air 
passengers (Maldives, 2008). The proposed levy is designed to benefi t the Kyoto 
Protocol Adaptation Fund, which is currently replenished by a 2% solidarity 
levy on the share of proceeds from the CDM. In a manner similar to the Tobin 
Tax for fi nancial stability, Madagascar (2008) proposed “an international tax on 
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global monetary transactions or on fossil fuels.”
Additional ODA from developed countries, and penalties or fi nes on 
noncompliance with emissions reduction and fi nancial resources commitments 
by developed members can also be tabled as potential sources of new and 
additional fi nancial support for mitigation and/or adaptation, although these may 
not be called global environmental taxes.
2. Structure of the Regime Complex
The various proposals on climate fi nance are to be assessed in relation to 
institutional arrangements, which can facilitate or constrain agent behavior. 
Following the Lotka-Volterra model on predator–prey interactions, several 
structural relationships between two regimes can be summarized as in Table 
1 (Mori, 2006). The fi rst is mutualism, where benefi ts can be received by 
both interacting regimes (plus, plus). The second is commensalism, which 
is a relationship that directly helps one regime but does not benefi t or affect 
the other much (plus, null). The third category is divided into parasitism and 
predation. Parasitism occurs when one small regime benefi ts at the expense 
of the other large regime (plus, minus). A similar relationship can be seen 
in predation, although the predator regime may destroy the prey regime. 
Mutualism, commensalism, and parasitism all demonstrate the ecological 
concept of symbiosis. Predation and the three categories following are not cases 
of symbiosis. Fourth, in a neutral relationship, two regimes are linked only 
indirectly without any direct effect on each other (null, null). The fi fth category 
is amensalism, which is detrimental to one regime and neutral to the other (minus, 
null). The sixth is competition, in which two-way negative effects fl ow to both 
regimes.
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Table 1: Synchronic Relationships of the Regime Complex Structure
Mutualism Commensalism Parasitism/Predation Neutralism Amensalism Competition
Regime A + + + 0 – –
Regime B + 0 – 0 0 –
The relationship between economic and environmental regimes can fall 
into any of the above categories. Both the fi nancial crisis and climate change, 
which are genuinely global issues, put denationalization pressures on nation-
state actors as agents, as well as on the interstate system as a structure. Actions 
and reactions of the state actors in climate fi nance negotiations can cause both 
symbiotic integration and nonsymbiotic fragmentation of spatial dimensions of 
the regime complex. It is important to consider the spatial dimension of climate 
fi nance in the regime complex in terms of at least three conceptions of space: 
geographical areas, issue areas, and policy space.
The formal negotiation parties, which represent the interests of territorial 
states, formed groups with similar geopolitical interests and submitted their 
proposals. The levels of GHG emissions in the Northern Hemisphere with more 
developed countries have been higher than those in the Southern Hemisphere. 
The GHG concentrations in the Northern Hemisphere with its greater landmass 
will increase more rapidly than in the Southern Hemisphere, dispersed emissions 
will soon cause the environmental and economic effects of global warming 
in both Hemispheres. Among others, the European Union (EU), established 
to foster regional integration as a reaction to the demise of the Bretton Woods 
system, shares common geopolitical interests in leading climate negotiation. 
Although the United States withdrew from ratifying the Kyoto Protocol, in 
sharing similar interests with other non-EU Annex I countries it sought fl exible 
mechanisms and formed the umbrella group for the Kyoto Protocol. The Group 
of 77, the group of developing countries in the UN system, and China share 
development concerns in general; however, developing countries have divergent 
interests. China became one of the current largest emitting countries, whereas 
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the Alliance of Small Island States shares similar development challenges 
and adaptation needs, in particular vulnerability related to sea level rise. The 
Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) opposes plans to 
reduce oil consumption and carbon taxes on energy-intensive commodities, 
and advocates “adaptation” with “response measures” by carbon capture and 
storage, using possible tax revenues in industrialized oil consuming countries.(2)
The Coalition for Rainforest Nations seeks to reform the current international 
regulatory and economic frameworks to reconcile forest stewardship with 
economic development by linking their tropical forest conservation efforts to 
fi nancial incentives, such as tax credits. Informal consultation forums, such as 
G20 and MEF, are becoming important places to reach a consensus on fi nance, 
climate, and climate fi nance.
The degree of globalization or denationalization varies not only across 
geographical areas, but also across issue areas. Because mutually supportive 
symbiotic institutional arrangements should be economically effi cient, socially 
fair, and environmentally effective, it is important to focus on at least three 
different issue areas, or the three pillars of sustainable development, namely, 
economic, social, and environmental aspects. Economically, environmental taxes 
can be conducive to or compete with both macroeconomic and microeconomic 
policies. Socially, climate fi nance can be considered in relation to employment, 
poverty, health, and education, as seen in the Millennium Development Goals 
(MDGs). It is also important for climate fi nance to take account of different 
environmental issues relating to the atmosphere, biosphere, geosphere, and 
hydrosphere. Even on the issue of climate change, institutional linkages between 
UNFCCC, the Kyoto Protocol, and a post-2012 arrangement are a matter of 
debate.
As for policy space, climate fi nance would limit or expand policy space 
for both developed and developing states as well as for nonstate actors. 
Cooperative actions on globally standardized environmental taxes may lead to a 
The EU suggests that response measures should be discussed as mitigation.(2)
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deterioration of the national autonomy of the state. Cooperative actions may be 
taken within a supranational entity, as exemplifi ed by the EU Emission Trading 
System (EU ETS). Decentralization pressures also facilitate local tax and levy 
systems at the subnational level of provinces and cities. Transnational actions 
include a solidarity tax proposal from civil society and sectoral approaches by 
multinationals. These relationships between stakeholders can be symbiotic, if 
their policy spaces are positively secured.
3. Transformation of the Regime Complex
In addition to the synchronic concept of regime complex governance, the 
diachronic concept of sustainability calls for theoretical refi nement of regime 
transformation across past, present, and future generations. In the natural 
sciences, closed and open systems can be distinguished by energy and mass. 
According to physics, neither energy nor matter can be exchanged in an isolated 
system. A closed system can exchange energy but not matter. By contrast, open 
systems continuously interact with the environment. An open equilibrium system 
is stabilized within a short-term period, whereas an open nonequilibrium system 
is not stabilized for a long-term period. Between these two open systems, one 
may posit an open system in which a dynamic evolution without equilibrium can 
be seen in a mid-term period but equilibrium may be achieved in the long run.
Using this metaphor, Table 2 shows that the international regime complex 
can be conceptualized as an equilibrium or nonequilibrium system, with or 
without involving the input and output of soft power (principles, norms, rules, 
and decision-making procedures) and material power (capital, labor, and nature). 
The military security regime seems to be isolated from the climate regime, 
although the environmental security concept has been widely discussed and a 
proposal for a global tax on the arms trade has also been studied.(3) Most previous 
and currently existing international regimes are closed regimes within specifi c 
issue areas and geographical boundaries, in which the state actors are primary 
For instance, see The Landau Report (2004).(3)
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decision makers. The international monetary and fi nancial regime has evolved 
within central banks and international fi nancial institutions with a variety of 
currencies: national, international (gold standard), and key (gold-exchange 
standard). The post-Bretton Woods fl oating regime is called a “non-system,” 
in which a de facto fi xed-exchange regime with the euro currency emerged. 
European economic and monetary integration has evolved from regional 
integration of coal, steel, and other tradable goods and services, including labor 
forces. Thus, the deepening and broadening of European integration can be 
regarded as an evolutionary regime.
Table 2: Dynamic Equilibrium and Nonequilibrium of the Regime Complex
Regime Soft Power Material Power
Equilibrium Isolated IN IN
Closed IN/OUT IN
Open (short term) IN/OUT IN/OUT
Nonequilibrium Evolutionary (mid term) IN/OUT IN/OUT
Open (long term) IN/OUT IN/OUT
International environmental regimes started being formed in the 1970s and 
evolved rapidly by interacting with development regimes, which also began 
developing in the post-World War II context. The principle of the “polluter 
pays” was originally established in the domestic context of developed countries, 
and recognized internationally later, and yet the current UNFCCC does not 
explicitly mention this principle. The UNFCCC explicitly mentions the principle 
of common but differentiated responsibility, and yet developed countries do not 
apply this principle to development issues. Financial and technological fl ows 
go beyond the fi nancial regime and infl uence environmental and social issues. 
Thus, the current stage of the regime complex on fi nance, climate change, and 
development constitutes a partially open system, in which norms and material 
power are limitedly circulated across these issue areas.
Fiscal policy, including taxation, at the national level is normally 
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determined by “muddling through” based on the past record. Market forecasting, 
the target of fi nancial policy, is often determined by short-term profi ts. To 
overcome government failure and market failure, the international regimes 
for development and environment have recently introduced the backcasting 
approach, which sets mid-term and long-term targets. The development 
community set out and has been monitoring mid-term MDGs mainly by 2015. 
The climate community is now negotiating to establish mid-term targets at 
around 2020, and a long-term goal at around 2050. The self-imposed time 
frameworks in international negotiations have often caused delays and thus the 
international regimes only slowly evolve or devolve, as shown in the World 
Trade Organization (WTO) Doha Development Agenda negotiations. The mid-
term and long-term goal-setting practices across different regions, different issue 
areas, and different stakeholders may make the regimes open-ended and further 
dynamically complex.
III. Synchronic Governance of the Regime Complex Structure
1. Geographical Areas
The integration of political spaces can be operationalized as transaction 
cost or convergent prices of carbon across geographical areas in economic 
terms. The proposal for a uniform global carbon levy, taking into account the 
principles of common but differentiated responsibility and the polluter pays by 
differentiated revenue collection based on per capita GDP and differentiated 
share of revenue allocation to a global Multilateral Adaptation Fund, would 
address demands from developing countries if their representation in decision 
making were democratically secured. However, creating a new global institution 
with a compliance mechanism, including a solution to tax havens, must be 
solved adequately. Creating a global tax arrangement is not independent of the 
existing arrangements and needs political support from the main taxpayers: 
the US and other OECD and OPEC members. It should be noted that this 
uniform global climate fi nance regime was proposed by Switzerland, and 
similar multilateral arrangements shared by other Environment Integrity 
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Group members have been proposed: Mexico’s proposal for a World Climate 
Change Fund and Korea’s proposal for carbon crediting nationally appropriate 
mitigation actions (NAMAs). Switzerland, as a non-EU Annex I country, has a 
strong preference for global standardization without becoming a member of the 
EU. Mexico’s proposed fund is to receive contributions from all countries based 
on assessed criteria and administered by the World Bank or other multilateral 
institutions. Korea’s proposal for crediting NAMAs assumes carbon credits are 
to be given for mitigation arising from NAMAs. Mexico and Korea, as new 
OECD members graduating from developing country groups in Latin America 
and East Asia, respectively, have incentives to form multilaterally standardized 
arrangements while retaining their non-Annex I country status.
Another possibility is the option of region-wide carbon tax arrangements. 
Among others, the seemingly most feasible region for a common environmental 
tax in the post-2012 period will be Europe, where 25 of the 27 EU members are 
Annex I countries. In fact, several attempts have been made by early introducers 
such as Sweden for a unitary EU carbon tax. Such a tax has not materialized so 
far, however, because other developed countries feared losing fi scal autonomy 
and less prosperous crisis economies were worried about the additional tax 
burden (EurActiv, 2009). Instead of a region-wide tax, Europe has developed 
the EU ETS, which requires large, energy-intensive power plants to sell and buy 
permits to release CO2 and other GHGs into the atmosphere. Revisions were 
also proposed, such as the auctioning of initial allowances. However, revenue 
from auctioning is less predictable than revenue by taxation, and prices in 
carbon markets can fl uctuate for participants. In practice, it will not be possible 
for a government to increase initial allowances under the cap and trade scheme, 
although a government can easily increase a tax level if the initial level does not 
achieve goals for emission cuts.
Another possibility is the option of concerted unilateral actions on 
national environmental taxes with a fl at rate without creating global or regional 
institutional arrangements, thus with a lower administrative cost. A carbon 
tax is an important option for Annex I countries, which agreed to reduce 
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emissions within their borders, and Annex II countries, which pay the cost 
for developing countries. Annex I countries adopting carbon taxes may make 
border adjustments, if necessary, to keep their industrial competitiveness. Annex 
II countries may make fi nancial contributions by issuing defi cit-fi nancing 
national bonds, but overdependence on this measure is problematic in terms of 
intergenerational justice. Therefore, a carbon tax will adequately function to 
raise funds while mitigating emissions and restoring government autonomy.
2. Issue Areas
Environmental taxes can potentially confl ict with or generate synergic 
effects on other issue areas. The structural relationships between and within 
the three pillars of sustainable development, namely, economic, social, and 
environmental aspects, need to be considered. It is important to consider 
a balance of revenue share between different factors of production. Many 
countries have a higher dependence on labor and capital as revenue sources.(4)
Carbon taxes can reform the regime complex structure across issue areas by 
designing a strong double dividend of mitigation effects and tax distortion 
reduction across factors and sectors.
The proposal for levies on international monetary transactions was 
originally intended to stabilize the international fi nancial system based on the 
fi nancial version of the “polluter pays” principle in macroeconomic policies. 
Among others, this is the only proposal that explicitly focuses on fi nancial 
stability. It could start from a plurilateral form as currently seen in the Leading 
Group on Innovative Financing for Development, but a global application is 
needed for effective and fair treatment. The Draft Treaty on Global Currency 
Transaction Tax (CTT) gives the diagnosis that the current system of global 
fi nance is both unstable and undemocratic. The CTT is expected to stabilize 
fi nance and democratize the multilateral decision-making system for social 
For instance, the ratios of environmental tax bases and labor tax bases were 6.2% and 47.6% 
in Japan (2000) and 8.5% and 63.8% in Germany (2005). See Park Seung-Joon (2007).
(4)
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development needs. The currency exchange regime is not directly related to 
carbon emissions, and yet if a globally democratized body decides to allocate 
tax revenues for climate change actions, they can do so (Patomaki, 2001).
Emissions trading and environmental taxes can be closely connected to 
microeconomic policies. GHG emission units in a market created by emissions 
trading may be called a new “currency” or “commodity.” Although a carbon 
market has so far no confl ict with the international trading regime, if GHG 
emission units are truly tradable products or services, emissions trading may 
potentially confl ict with the nondiscrimination and other rules of the regime 
of the WTO (Voigt, 2008). Carbon taxes and levies on domestic and imported 
products and domestic production processes are WTO-consistent, and yet if tax 
border adjustments are applied only because of the environmentally unfriendly 
production methods abroad, they will confl ict with the nondiscrimination 
principle for like products (Sapmson, 2001). It is consistent with the WTO 
Subsidies Agreement for a country to subsidize the production process of a fi rm 
to facilitate low-carbon technology adoption (nonactionable subsidies). It is not 
always clear, however, whether or not emissions trading and carbon taxes fall 
into general exceptions, such as the necessary protection of “human, animal, or 
plant life or health,” as spelled out by Article XX of the GATT.
Another issue on climate change and trade is the relationship between 
technology transfer and the WTO TRIPS agreement. While liberalizing 
environmental goods and services can result in mutualism between climate 
change, trade, and development, there will be potential competition between 
TRIPS and transfer of patented technology. Developing countries call for 
compulsory licensing of patented technology or the exemption of LDCs from 
patent protection, whereas many developed countries want to retain the current 
regime on intellectual property. For developing countries to apply compulsory 
licensing to patented mitigation and adaptation technologies, it will be necessary 
to redefi ne and agree to a conceptual defi nition of “protectionisms” of three 
issue areas: protection of intellectual property rights, human rights protection, 
and environmental protection.
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Global trade has also been facilitated by the growth of the international 
transportation sector. Because emissions from domestic fl ights are covered 
by the Kyoto Protocol targets, emissions from international fl ights involving 
Annex I countries are also to be covered. Opponents argue that such a proposal 
contradicts the ICAO Council Resolution on Taxation of International Air 
Transport (ICAO, 2000), which regarded taxation of international air transport 
as a major obstacle to the development of the sector and sought the elimination 
of “all forms of taxation on the sale or use of international transport by air, 
including taxes on gross receipts of operators and taxes levied directly on 
passengers or shippers.” The resolution was made before the Kyoto Protocol 
entered into force, and the international transport sector will be sustainably 
developed if such taxes are collected and used for sustainable aviation programs.
With regard to social aspects, a typical criticism is that carbon taxes might 
be regressive and people on lower incomes will suffer most. However, there 
are many methods to reduce regressiveness. One idea for easing a regressive 
carbon tax is a tax deduction or a tax credit for lower income taxpayers. Equally 
important, excessive reliance on labor as a tax base should be corrected in an 
aging society where the proportion of the working population is declining. The 
distortion as such can be effectively reduced by a shift to taxation on unearned 
income and environmental pollution. Al Gore’s proposal (2008) for a revenue-
neutral carbon tax replaces payroll taxes: “We should tax what we burn, not 
what we earn. This is the single most important policy change we can make.”
An effective carbon tax should also be designed in relation to other 
environmental regimes. For instance, taxation on ozone-depleting substances 
and subsidies for chlorofl uorocarbon (CFC) substitutes have mixed implications 
for climate fi nance and alternative technology. Since hydrochlorofl uorocarbons 
(HCFCs) have a lower power to delete the ozone layer, and hydrofl uorocarbons 
(HFCs) have no such power, both HCFCs and HFCs were used as CFC 
replacements in the ozone regime. However, these CFC replacements are all 
GHGs with extreme global warming potential per unit. Therefore, taxation 
on CFCs and HCFCs would benefi t both the ozone regime and the climate 
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regime, and yet subsidization of HCFCs and HFCs is ozone friendly but not 
climate friendly. Thus, it is important to design mutually supportive taxation 
and funding mechanisms. Now that the ozone regime has established a plan to 
reduce HCFC emissions and the Kyoto regime covers HFCs as a targeted GHG, 
similar coordination is to be made between climate fi nance mechanisms and the 
Multilateral Fund for the Implementation of the Montreal Protocol.
Coordination between the Kyoto Protocol and a post-2012 regime is also 
needed. The rationale of the proposals for shares of proceeds in the fl exible 
Kyoto mechanism is understandable, and yet it will be diffi cult to determine 
an appropriate level of the proceeds of the CDM, joint implementation, and 
emissions trading. Experience shows that CDM projects have been concentrated 
on a selected number of developing countries. The question regarding which 
countries, Annex I or non-Annex I, should have the obligation to pay the CDM 
proceeds is also a matter of debate. Excessive shares of proceeds of the CDM 
might affect incentives for both developed and developing countries to employ 
the CDM option.
3. Policy Space
It is often argued that atmospheric and development spaces for developing 
countries have been narrowed. Such a predator-prey relationship between 
developed and developing countries can be transformed into a situation where 
the policy space of developing countries can be restored. When developed 
countries shift themselves into zero-carbon societies and developing countries 
seek to become low-carbon societies, the capacity of the developing state for 
social and environmental policies is improved by tax revenues. Poor people 
in developing countries who spend a higher proportion of their income on 
fossil fuel energy costs may not be affected by environmental taxes if cheaper 
renewable energies are provided.(5) In doing so, assessed contributions or other 
For instance, a solar lantern campaign has been promoted by Tata Energy and Resource 
Institute, India. http://labl.teriin.org/
(5)
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funds, raised through environmental taxes or other means in developed countries, 
should be provided for NAMAs and national adaptation programs for actions 
(NAPAs) for developing countries.(6) Major developing countries may consider 
carbon taxes at lower rates as part of unilateral NAMAs, or coordinated NAMAs 
with no-lose targets by linking them with fi nancial and technological support 
from developed countries. Financial assistance for tropical forest countries can 
also be linked to their conservation efforts in reducing emissions, deforestation, 
and degradation in developing countries (REDD+), which will mitigate about 
20% of global GHG emissions stemming from tropical deforestation. While 
timbers from sustainable forestry can be duty-free, taxes and penalties should be 
placed on unsustainable products and deforestation.
Carbon taxes can also expand the policy space for local governments. 
A nationally standardized global carbon tax can be collected and used by 
local governments, so that tax revenues can be used for local needs more 
effectively. A report by a Japanese prefectural government (Kanagawa 
Prefecture Study Group, 2009) points out advantages of feasible downstream 
taxation and the “frontrunner” model function for a local government. Carbon 
taxes in local communities, as seen in Canada’s British Columbia and the City 
of Boulder, Colorado, are easily understood by businesses and individuals, 
and can capture emissions on a production or consumption basis. Even if the 
forming of a national consensus on a carbon tax is delayed, local practices 
can provide a feasible model to be nationalized later, as shown in President 
Obama’s attempt to nationalize California’s standards of emissions and fuel 
economy.
Local environmental taxation can also expand policy space for the 
business sector through the “race to the top.” An example is the partnership 
between the Renault-Nissan alliance and two local governments in Japan, 
Kanagawa Prefecture and Yokohama City, where Nissan is headquartered 
The IISD proposal for a phased approach suggests that advanced developing countries set 
sectoral or subnational no-lose targets with a base year of 2005. See ENB on the side (2009).
(6)
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and their factories that manufacture electric vehicles (EVs) are located. These 
local governments announced the provision of subsidies and tax credits for 
purchasing a zero-emissions EV, while considering investing subsidized parking 
lot use with charging facilities and introducing a local carbon tax system. With 
a green vehicle tax system introduced by the Japanese central government, 
local consumers can purchase a Nissan EV at a similar price to the hybrid cars 
manufactured by Nissan’s business competitors, Toyota and Honda. For Renault-
Nissan, a late developer of green cars, this partnership can create competitive 
advantages over their competitors. For the local governments, it can contribute 
to the development of a pollution-reduced transportation system, as well as 
facilitate local employment. Taken together, it can be the forerunner of green 
recovery both domestically and internationally.
Thus, state power and business interests, as well as norms and scientifi c 
knowledge, can transform the regime complex for environmental taxes. In 
particular, local governments and the private sector can play a role in forming 
and transforming the climate fi nance regime complex.(7)
IV. Diachronic Governance of Regime Dynamics Transformation
1. Evaluating Past Records
The issues on past records of emissions revolve around the debate 
on historical responsibility. Developing countries stress the importance of 
historical responsibility, because past emissions from developed countries limit 
developmental space and potential mitigation actions add an extra burden to 
developing countries, and because historically, accumulated emissions continue 
to affect the climate crisis. Many developed countries argue that historical 
responsibility is not mentioned in the current Convention and there is the legal 
issue of an ex post facto law. That is, newly created law should not be applied 
retroactively to the problems made by the previous generation that has already 
(7) It has also been noted that private authorities, both business and NGO actors, played an 
important role in forming and transforming the emissions trading regime complex. See Green 
(2008).
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disappeared, and it is morally problematic to accuse the previous generation, 
which was uninformed about the GHG problem and fi ndings in climate change 
science.
It is also argued that it is diffi cult to collect data on all six GHGs to measure 
historical responsibility for all countries —political boundaries have also 
changed —since the Industrial Revolution. However, it is possible to integrate 
the historical responsibility debate into climate fi nance by limiting past records 
to 1990, which the UNFCCC defi ned as the historical base year for most Annex 
I countries.(8) Both the Convention Annex I countries and the Kyoto Protocol 
Annex B countries are legally responsible for historical emissions since then, 
when the Convention parties agreed to establish it as a baseline. In the case of 
noncompliance with the Kyoto Protocol emission reduction targets, the Annex 
B countries in noncompliance might be enforced to commit to an additional 
30% reduction during the second commitment period (Kyoto Protocol, 2005). 
Therefore, it should be reconfi rmed that the base year of 1990 is built into the 
Copenhagen negotiation, although Japan and others point out that 1990 as a base 
year favors certain countries. A complex base-year system of F-gas emissions 
is also a refl ection of the diffi cult regulation of past emissions. One way of 
avoiding the base year question is to introduce carbon taxes. “It is not necessary 
to construct a historical base year of emissions,” according to Nordhaus (2007). 
“A natural baseline for the post-2012 period would be no-controls level of 
emissions.”
Another dimension of past records in the isolated system is agedness 
associated with indigenous peoples. For indigenous peoples, the concepts 
of Mother Earth and traditional ways of consultation with elders have not 
only spiritual and ethical but also policy implications. They call for adequate 
funding from the Annex I countries to pay for their “historical and ecological 
debt” and effective participation of indigenous peoples in decision making 
and implementation of mitigation and adaptation activities. They call for the 
(8) For the historical responsibility debate, see Müller, et al. (2007).
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appointment of representatives from indigenous peoples in funding mechanisms, 
so that they can express their collective rights and concerns about the negative 
effects of both fossil fuel development and alternative energy options and 
mechanisms, especially nuclear energy, large-scale dams, geoengineering, “clean 
coal”, agro-fuel, plantations, carbon trading, the CDM, and reducing REDD 
activities (Anchorage Declaration, 2009).
2. Monitoring Present Performance
“Developed countries,” “economies in transition,” and “developing 
countries” are all political labels for economies in historical or present 
progressive form. Although establishing new subcategories of “advanced 
developing countries” and “poor developing countries” is diplomatically 
diffi cult, environmental categorizations, such as “major emitting countries” 
and “environmentally vulnerable countries,” are important to monitor the 
present performance of emissions as well as socioeconomic adaptation needs in 
temporal dimensions of regime complex governance.
It is important to assess fi nancial contributions by taking into account the 
current trends in emissions growth, economic growth, and population growth 
(or the human development index). Since today’s emissions become tomorrow’s 
historical responsibility, today’s economic growth becomes tomorrow’s ability 
to pay. Monitoring of environmental effectiveness and climate fi nance should 
be done for both historical and current performance. More complicatedly, 
the regime complex calls for environmental indexes to be divided by current 
indicators of social and economic conditions. When emissions are regarded 
as a sort of human right, emissions per capita might be suggested. When 
socioeconomic ability to pay is taken into account, emission indexes may be 
divided by GDP or the human development index. Available statistics for these 
indicators will actually be past records, rather than current ones. However, these 
recent past data can be used to monitor current performance. Uncertainty will 
be involved in reduction potentials of energy use, with possible technological 
development and educational innovation, and the marginal cost of reduction may 
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overevaluate past reduction efforts. National emission reduction objectives and 
assessed contributions may be decided on some combinations of these indicators 
for present performance. How to combine which indicators will be a parameter 
for future openness of a climate fi nance regime.
Compared with emissions trading, carbon taxes impose more directly 
courses on current emitting performance. Carbon taxes are imposed on 
current emitters to pay the current price for carbons set by the government and 
encourage their future efforts for reduction, whereas emissions trading permits 
current emitters to buy carbons at the current market price and rewards the past 
efforts of other emitters. Fluctuation of the carbon market price may not reward 
the past efforts of emission reduction. To allow a current emitter’s purchase of 
another emitter’s efforts may not lead to behavioral change in the future efforts 
of current emitters.
Another issue in the debate on current performance is the question of 
which is cheaper —current or future payments? The “cheaper in the future” 
argument is based on the assumption that new abatement methods and new 
technology will be developed, sooner or later. However, later responses would 
worsen the negative effects of climate change and therefore cost more. The 2006 
Stern Review (2007) estimated that 1% (later modifi ed as 2%) of global gross 
domestic product (GDP) per year is required to be invested to maintain CO2
concentration levels at 450–550 ppm, while the cost of damage due to inaction 
will be 5–20% of global GDP per year (Guardian, 2008). Although critics argue 
that the Stern Review underestimated the cost of mitigation and overestimated 
the cost of inaction, it is not an exaggeration to say that the cost of inaction 
will be larger than the cost of appropriate actions now. Rather, technological 
advancement in the future is more possible, when economic incentives, such as 
environmental taxes, are adequately provided.
3. Assessing Future Pathways
IPCC modeling shows that global warming and sea level rise will 
continue even if GHG concentrations are stabilized. Thus, no policies or 
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measures may be able to stop global warming quickly, and yet swift actions 
for quick effects on emission reductions and fund-raising for adaptation 
and technology transfer are urgently needed. Achieving and sustaining 
stabilization targets requires predictable and sustainable revenues, as well as 
speedy disbursements of adaptation funds and rapid diffusion of low-emission 
technologies.
To facilitate these purposes, backcasting approaches to policy selection 
with both long-term and mid-term targets for emission reductions are needed. 
The advantages of setting mid-term targets include that they could provide 
an opportunity to review the effectiveness of policy tools and further regime 
complex transformation. Even though the limitation and reduction targets are 
the same, the pathways of rapid emission reduction and stability, slow reduction 
and later rapid reduction, or linear reduction toward mid-term and long-term 
goals will make a difference. Social behavior resulting from carbon taxes and 
their raised fund use may facilitate technological development, rather than late 
responses.
An ideal type of long-term cooperative action for climate change seeks a 
dynamic equilibrium system, in which climate stability, fi nancial stability, and 
social stability are achieved with dynamic transfers of fi nance and technology. 
However, different proposals implicitly or explicitly assume different pathways. 
All the submitted proposals, except the currency transaction levy, are not 
directly intended to lead to fi nancial stability in the long run. This is the pathway 
to fi nancial stability fi rst, and development and climate stability later. Increased 
shares of the proceeds from the CDM and additional ODA assume a pathway 
of development fi rst, and the environment later. No explicit link has yet been 
developed between a post-2012 regime and development efforts to achieve 2015 
MDG targets. Mid-term and long-term targets for climate change and climate 
fi nance will improve the reviewability of not only environmental but also social 
and fi nancial architectures.
The role of environmental taxes for social behavioral change should not 
be undervalued. The function of caring for future generations is what is called 
27
Taxis in Cosmos
“generativity.” (9) By showing changes in sustainable consumption patterns by 
choosing goods and services with environmental taxes and fi nancial incentives, 
adult consumers can demonstrate their sustainable consumption behaviors 
and lifestyle models to younger generations, who will then internalize those 
patterns for successive generations. This kind of environmental education and 
training function can be accompanied effi ciently and effectively by the option of 
environmental taxes and fi nancial incentives.
V. Conclusion
Climate change is a relatively recently recognized global issue that 
affects widespread areas synchronically, and it is a complexly changing 
intergenerational issue that is to be diachronically restored and prevented 
across generations. The international monetary and fi nancial system has a long 
history across centuries. Climate fi nance is emerging at the crossroad of these 
evolving regimes of climate, fi nance, and others. The current global crisis stems 
from this shaky disjuncture. The real source of the crisis is the lack of effective 
governance of the regime complex and regime transformation. The idea of 
environmental taxes was narrowly recognized by shortsighted negotiators only 
in terms of international competitiveness, and was not fully integrated into 
policies and measures in the Kyoto Protocol negotiations until the midst of the 
1997 Asian fi nancial crisis. The world has achieved little in terms of global 
reforms of either climate or fi nancial architectures since then. Mistakes of the 
past could be repeated if the multiple and long-term advantages of environmental 
taxes are overlooked. Those symbiotic and coevolutionary advantages include: 
autonomous, distributed, and cooperative integration; issue linkage function; 
restoration and expansion of policy space; historical restoration; current 
reformation; and future reconstruction. There are also shortcomings —the 
political cost and potential bureaucratic machinery. These shortcomings can 
The concept of generativity that was proposed by Erik H. Erikson (1993) has been discussed in 
the context of intergenerational justice. See Kotaro Suzumura, et al. (2006).
(9)
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be minimized but are not avoidable, because individuals can make choices by 
themselves but a nation-state requires an institutional mechanism to make a 
collective decision. International decisions can be made unilaterally or jointly, 
but collective or coordinated choices require effective governance mechanisms 
for the regime complex. The most serious disadvantage is overconfi dence in the 
managed order of taxes without taking into consideration the dynamic power 
of spontaneous orders. Taken together, however, advantages will outweigh 
disadvantages.
These advantages of governance constitute a set of rules derived from the 
coevolution of norms and procedures of the regime complex. First, the nationally 
managed order for environmental taxes is based on corrective justice and this can 
be implemented unilaterally. Second, the internationally emerged spontaneous 
order of emissions trading is based on exchange justice and implemented 
jointly. Third, the collectively managed order of a global environmental tax is 
based on distributive justice and is conducted multilaterally. Fourth, concerted 
spontaneous orders of solidarity taxes and levies can deconstruct existing ideas 
of levies and widen possibilities for new climate fi nancial mechanisms. Policy 
makers and negotiators should adequately recognize multifaceted dimensions 
of global environmental taxes as a policy tool, which evokes linkage across 
space and transformation across time. Shortsighted responses and inaction 
on environmental taxes without an understanding of the breadth of and the 
prospects for such complexity have often resulted in the repetition of policy 
mistakes.
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Taxis in Cosmos:
Global Environmental Taxes in Regime Complex Governance
<Summary>
Katsuhiko Mori
Climate fi nance is one of the key agendas for international negotiations 
for a post-2012 climate change regime. Among several proposals for climate 
fi nance, the advantages of global environmental taxes should be reconsidered 
in relation to regime complex governance. Synchronically, the introduction of 
a price mechanism for carbon taxes at the national, regional, or global level 
is a step leading to further geographical integration, while restoring state 
capacities for fi scal autonomy. It can also contribute to forming a politically 
spacious, environmentally effective, socially fair, and economically effi cient 
climate fi nance mechanism across different issue areas, if there is a synergistic 
combination of multiple stakeholders with a variety of factors, such as power, 
interest, norms, and scientifi c knowledge. Diachronically, assessed contributions 
as well as carbon taxes imposed on developed countries can address partially 
the issue of historical responsibility. The introduction of carbon taxes as part of 
national mitigation actions with reduction targets in developed countries, and 
with no-lose targets in developing countries by linking fi nancial fl ows from 
developed countries, could address current and future responsibility. Climate 
stability and fi nancial stability in the long run should be achieved by dynamic 
emission limitation and fi nancial reform. Shortsighted responses without an 
understanding of the breadth of and the prospects for such complexity have 
often resulted in the repetition of policy mistakes.
